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By 2019, a record high of 79.5million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a
result of persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights violations (UNHCR
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to ‘return’ or find a ‘durable solution’.Multiple waves of displacement are common,
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gests. Yet if ‘return’, as a one-directional durable solution is increasingly rare, the
need to understand it in difficult and dynamic contexts of precarity and multi-
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Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. ‘Return’ and the ‘re-
turnee’ category is broad and includes former combatants, especially those involved
in non-state armed groups. We survey the historical and conceptual background of
‘return’ and its growing prominence in international policy before introducing four
areas in which the articles in this special issue contribute to our understanding of
internally displacedperson, refugee andcombatant returndynamics: conceptualiza-
tions of home and mobilities; everyday negotiation of belonging; the relationship
between return and ‘cycles of violence’; and finally, the ways in which return shapes
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Introduction
The UNHCR has called the 2010s ‘the decade of displacement’ (UNHCR 2020a:
4). By 2019, a record high of 79.5million peoplewere forcibly displacedworldwide
as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights violations (ibid: 2).
The ‘decade of displacement’ label recalls a more optimistic moniker: ‘the decade
of repatriation’, coined by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako
Ogata, to describe the 1990s. Today, the UNHCR continues to prioritize safe
and sustainable refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) return as a response
to conflict-driven displacement, but acknowledges that growing numbers of peo-
ple remain in situations of protracted precarity, with ‘little hope of a durable
solution’ (ibid: 48). Since the turn of the century, repatriation figures have declined
as displacement figures have increased (Hansen 2018: 134). This is not surprising
given that the vast majority of contemporary displacement is caused by wars and
‘generalized violence’ that last for years on end and resist peaceful political reso-
lution (ibid). In the last decade, only 3.9 million refugees have returned to their
country of origin, compared with 14.6 million in the period 1993–2003 (Hansen
2018: 134; UNHCR 2020a: 50). Meanwhile, available data suggests that roughly
31 million IDPs were able to return or find a ‘solution’ to displacement during the
last decade (ibid: 32). Yet the increase in IDP numbers over that period are
staggering. In the absence of a political resolution to the causes of flight in the
first place, multiple waves of displacement are common, and return may not be a
particularly durable solution at all. In fact, the dynamics of return may trigger
further waves of insecurity, violence and indeed further displacement.
If ‘return’, as a one-directional durable solution is increasingly rare, the broader
topic is nonetheless an important area of continued study. But how might under-
standings of what ‘return’ means change in an increasingly difficult and dynamic
context of precarity and multi-directional mobility? The articles in this special
issue engage with this question and focus on what studies of return can tell us
about the ‘life cycle’ of conflict and displacement dynamics in war-affected
Central and East Africa, with a particular focus on Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Uganda. Inspired by earlier scholarship that
sees return as a complex process, rather than an ‘event’ (e.g. Allen 1996; Black and
Koser 1999; Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018: 3), they engage with under-
researched dynamics of return in conflict-affected places, examining the relation-
ships of returnees with each other, with the ‘stayee’ population; with state and
local government elites, andwith aid agencies as well as with other forms of ‘public
authority’. Where things have moved on peacefully, the contributors to this spe-
cial issue identify processes and practices of social repair that allow for co-
existence and improved well-being; where this is not the case, authors provide
fresh and compelling insights into why violence and cycles of displacement persist.
Our returnee category is broad and includes former combatants, particularly
those involved in non-state armed groups. In the context of DRC, South Sudan,
and Uganda, many such returnees occupy an ambiguous victim-perpetrator/
civilian-combatant status. While some have been involved in ‘Disarmament,
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De-mobilization and Re-integration’ (DDR) and transitional justice (TJ) proc-
esses, these tend to be sporadic, short-lived and reliant on donor funding. Many
others self-demobilized, including thousands of former Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) fighters in northern Uganda and ex-combatants in the Kivus in eastern
DRC who have undergone no formal return or resettlement processes but have
returned to civilian life. The articles in this special issue begin to shed light on how
and why some former combatants return and integrate peacefully, while others
become recruits of new violent groups, contributing to our understanding of the
‘life-cycle’ of conflict and displacement in this region.
We begin this introduction with a background to contemporary ‘return’ and its
growing prominence in international refugee policy. We go on to explore concep-
tual debates in the literature around the meaning and significance of ‘return’,
‘home’, and ‘emplacement’. Against this background, we introduce four areas
in which the articles in this special issue contribute to our understanding of
IDP, refugee and combatant return dynamics: conceptualizations of home and
mobilities; everyday negotiation of belonging; the relationship between return and
‘cycles of violence’; and finally, the ways in which return shapes and re-shapes
governance and public authority across settings.
The History of Return
At the point at which the ‘decade of return’ began, there was almost no published
research on the processes, dynamics and politics of return (UNHCR 1985; Crisp
1987; Allen and Morsink 1994: 2; Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018: 6). In 1994, a
donor report expressed concern that ‘what is being promoted as themost desirable
solution to refugee crises is a poorly understood social and spatial phenomenon’
(cf. ibid: 8). It was not long, however, before a substantial critical literature on
return and repatriation emerged, including studies that examined the experiences
of returnees and the ‘afterlife’ of the refugee across Africa, Asia, and Central
America (see e.g. Allen and Morsink 1994; Allen 1996; Kingma 1997; Koser
1997; Black and Koser 1999; Eastmond and Öjendal 1999; Vlassenroot and
Tegenbos 2018: 8). Before explaining how the articles in this special issue contrib-
ute to this literature, we briefly review the global historical trends that converged
towards the end of theColdWar to favour return and repatriation as the preferred
response to forced displacement. Following Crisp (2001), we view this through the
lens of key political and normative shifts that transformed the UNHCR from
being an ‘exile-oriented’ and ‘reactive’ refugee agency towards becoming a ‘home-
land orientated’, ‘proactive’ humanitarian agency (cf. UNHCR 1995; Crisp 2001:
175).
By the end of the Cold War, the international community was confronting a
very different kind of refugee situation to the one that existed when the 1951 UN
Refugee Convention was drafted. The 1951 Convention responded to those who
had been displaced by war and conflict in Europe and initially, refugee protection
was a useful tool in the ideological battle between East andWest (Loescher 2003:
7). In 1956, for example, after the Soviet military crackdown in Hungary, a US
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Navy sealift assisted Hungarians fleeing their homes and offered them refuge in
theUS. Photographs ofmen andwomen arriving atUS airports carrying suitcases
emblazoned with the words ‘United States Escape Program’ were widely publi-
cized, and their flight from communist oppression to sanctuary and protection in
theUSwas celebrated. Beyond the propaganda value of their personal accounts of
repression under Soviet rule, many eastern bloc refugees were educated and highly
skilled. US politicians spoke enthusiastically about the potential of these ‘pro-
ductive workers’ to benefit society and the economy by filling key gaps inmedical,
scientific, and industrial roles (Pastor 2016: 201).
With the accession of the 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR became a ‘global organ-
ization’ (Loescher 2003: 10). The original focus on providing legal protection to
refugees fleeing communist regimes expanded to include large-scale refugee relief
programmes across Africa and other developing regions (Crisp 2001: 169;
Loescher 2003: 15). The refugee camp model was a product of this shift but by
the late 1970s its many shortcomings encouraged amore developmental approach
towards displaced populations and host communities, including an emphasis on
self-sufficiency and sustainable development over long-term relief (Harrell-Bond
1986). This UNHCR (and broader donor) approach came to be known as the
‘refugee aid and development strategy’, but it was a difficult political balancing
act. Refugee populations were growing steadily, and while richer donor countries
did not want to grant refugees asylum on their own soil, they also had serious
reservations about pumping money into host countries that would not guarantee
sustainable integration as a final outcome. Host states in turn felt that if richer
countries were unwilling to burden share, the very least they could do was provide
substantial development funding, but even then, it was politically risky for them to
guarantee indefinite settlement (Crisp 2001: 170-171; Betts 2015).
In some respects, the end of the Cold War signalled the demise of the ‘refugee
aid and development’ strategy and set in motion a new approach: the ‘returnee aid
and development’ strategy (Crisp 2001: 173). With the ColdWar over, UNHCR-
administered repatriation was on the increase. For example, the collapse of the
USSR resulted in huge numbers returning to El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala; hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were repatriated from
Thailand in 1993 to vote in national elections; and roughly 1 million refugees
returned to Ethiopia from Eritrea after 1991 (Eastmond and Öjendal 1999;
Stepputat 1999; Kibreab 2002, 2003; Long 2013; Vlassenroot and Tegenbos
2018: 8). Returns during this period were not always straight-forward. In some
cases, they were hardly ‘voluntary’, part of a pattern of coerced return that had
already begun towards the end of the 1970s as host governments and host com-
munities began exhibiting ‘refugee fatigue’ (Barnett 2001: 255). The moral and
legal case for better UNHCR oversight of repatriation processes was therefore a
strong one. An expanding focus in this area was reflected in the budget: before the
mid-1980s an average of 2% of the UNHCR’s budget was spent on repatriation
programming; this increased to 14% in the period 1990–1997 (Crisp 2001: 174).
It was also the case that refugees were returning to fragile countries. The new
emphasis on assisting with repatriation dovetailed with a new focus on supporting
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peace-building, conflict prevention and development in return countries (see
UNHCR 1992, 1998, 2004; Macrae 1999). Barnett writes about a ‘conceptual
marriage’ taking place between ‘repatriation as a durable solution and repatri-
ation as a form of protection’ (2001: 25). A quote from a UNHCR official illus-
trates the shift well: ‘We used to give them seeds and supplies and a handshake at
the border, but now we are increasingly involved in the economic, political and
human rights situation of the home country’ (Barnett 2001: 25). By the end of the
1990s, the UNHCR had built closer links with the World Bank and other UN
agencies in an attempt to ensure better coherence and co-ordination between
shorter-term re-integration efforts and longer-term reconstruction efforts in
conflict-affected places. The later came to be known as the Brookings approach,
and the term ‘returnee aid and development’ was gradually phased out and
replaced with ‘post-conflict re-integration’ as the UNHCR became involved all
manner of ‘routine’ liberal peace-building efforts, from disarmament, demobil-
ization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, to transitional justice
(TJ) and reconciliation (Crisp 2001: 186; UNHCR 2004; UNHCR 2008;
MacGinty 2012). This explicitly recognized that successful ‘returns’ involved
not just refugees and IDPs but also combatants. The majority were rank-and-
file soldiers and fighters, and many occupied an ambiguous ‘victim-perpetrator’
status (Baines 2009), moving between combatant and civilian roles through coer-
cion or through choice.
This expansionist humanitarian agenda was underpinned by a new understand-
ing of global security, and how displacement and population movement threat-
ened it. While the end of the ColdWar set in motion repatriation for many, it also
ushered in a huge rise in intra-state wars across, for example, sub-Saharan Africa,
the Balkans, and South East Asia that generated further displacement. These civil
wars were framed by many politicians and sections of the media in the west as
global security threats in so far as they were ‘refugee-producing situations’
(UNHCR 1998), that could reach national borders. Asylum applications across
western Europe were rocketing, and far from being welcomed as during the cold
war, these refugees were often framed as ethnically and culturally ‘other’. A lan-
guage developed to express a new ‘protectionist political discourse’ and the socio-
economic impact on Western states was portrayed in stridently negative terms
(Zetter 1991, 2007; Boswell 2003: 25). Western governments reassured domestic
constituencies that, for those who had managed to gain entry, repatriation, rather
than assimilation was the end-goal (Zetter 1991: 56, 2007: 117). By the end of the
1990s, the figures were striking: between 1912 and 1969 nearly 50 million
European refugees were re-settled abroad (Chimini 1998: 364; cf. Bialczyk 2008:
10). By the end of the century, only 1 per cent of the world’s refugees were offered
re-settlement (ibid).
The ethical and political tensions between a more ‘expansionist’ humanitarian
agenda and a more protectionist refugee regime found expression in the new
category of the ‘internally displaced person’. In 1994, UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said that ‘population displacement, whether internal
or international has gone beyond the humanitarian domain to become a major
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political, security and socio-economic issue, affecting regional and global stability’
(cf. Hammerstad 2011: 237–8, italics added). Whereas in the past, the UNHCR
had functioned mainly as an agency that assisted refugees once they had crossed
borders, its emphasis was now on working with displaced persons and potential
refugees within their national borders, or promoting policies that would return
them to within those borders. To some extent this was welcomed as a progressive
agenda in so far as it recognized a need to offer assistance and protection to that
growing category of people who were displaced by conflict but who did not fall
under the refugee category. In 1998, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement were published, which included a right to a durable solution, not-
ably ‘to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of
habitual residence’ (UN Commission on Human Rights Guiding Principles,
Section V 1998; Bradley 2018: 219). The Guiding Principles were associated
with the emergence of a powerful normative agenda which re-conceptualized sov-
ereignty as a form of responsibility to populations. The UN Special Rapporteur
on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng had fam-
ously argued a few years earlier that ‘a government that allows its citizens to
suffer. . .cannot claim sovereignty in an effort to keep the outside world from
stepping in’ (Deng et al. 1996: 33). This provided a justification (albeit highly
contested) for a more interventionist ‘protection’ strategy in places where states
are ‘unwilling or unable’ to safeguard their own citizens from genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
It is significant that this emerging norm of responsibility to protect was intim-
ately linked with the pressing humanitarian and political question of what to do
about growing numbers of IDPs (Bellamy 2008). For many, there was concern
that the UNHCR’s new approach was actually a way of containing potential
refugees. As Loescher argued, ‘the UNHCR has always trod a perilous path be-
tween its mandate to protect refugees and asylum seekers and the demands placed
upon it by states to be a relevant actor in international relations’ (2003: vii). There
was concern that rather than providing refugees with protection, the UNHCR
was working to stem the flow of potential refugees through conflict resolution,
peace-keeping, peace-building, and humanitarian assistance. The internally dis-
placed person, or ‘IDP’ was a new operational category that became synonymous
with encampment and containment. Even if it was reluctantly complicit, some
argued that the UNHCR hadmade a ‘devils compact’, allowing humanitarianism
to become ‘the enemy of refugee rights’ (Barnett 2001: 246; Branch 2011).
Today, it is certainly the case that those displaced by conflict are less
likely to cross borders. The latest UNHCR figures tell us that of the 79.5 million
people displaced at the end of last year, 45.7 million were internally displaced
(UNHCR 2020a). For those who do cross borders, the prospect of a
durable solution remains remote. Nearly 80 per cent of today’s refugees are
caught up in situations of protracted displacement. The UNHCR (2020b)
acknowledges a:
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‘diminishing prospect for refugees when it comes to hopes of any quick end to their
plight. In the 1990s, on average 1.5 million refugees were able to return home each
year. Over the past decade that number has fallen to around 385,000 meaning that
growth in displacement is today far outstripping solutions’.
Last year witnessed the beginning of the implementation of the Global
Compact on Refugees and its Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
and a new UNHCR IDP policy (UNHCR 2019). Both highlight the desirability
and importance of ‘safe, voluntary, informed and sustainable return of displaced
people’ and the need to ‘support conditions in countries of origin for return in
safety and dignity’. They also acknowledge how difficult this is in contexts of
contemporary violent conflict.
Whilst also recognizing this difficulty, the articles in this special issue set out to
explore the under-researched dynamics of refugee, IDP and ex-combatant ‘return’
in conflict affected places. To kick-start the research project from which the
articles in this special issue derive, a systematic literature review of major debates
pertaining to refugee, IDP and ex-combatant ‘return’ was conducted (Vlassenroot
and Tegenbos 2018). (It found that much of the existing literature is structured
around global priorities relating to displacement and return, and therefore tends
to be both policy-orientated and normatively driven, seeking improvement in
global and national efforts towards repatriation and re-integration (ibid: 8).
There is, for example, a substantial literature that focuses on the decision-
making processes of returnees relating to return (e.g. Koser 1997; Omata 2013;
Harild et. al 2015); and on the extent towhich repatriationmaybe involuntary and
thus constitute ‘refoulement’ (e.g. Zieck 2004; Krever 2011).
In addition to the significant legalistic literature on repatriation, the extant
scholarship on return can be broken down into four main categories (see
Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018). The articles in this special issue both contribute
to—and challenge—our understanding in these areas. Firstly, there is a concep-
tual debate about the nature of ‘return’, ‘home’, and ‘emplacement’. Given the
importance of this debate in framing most of the articles in this special issue, we
explore its key tenets in the following section, and then outline how the articles in
this special issue advance our thinking in relation to these concepts. Secondly,
there is a small literature on the linkages between return/repatriation, re-
integration and development. This tends to equate sustainable returns with
socio-economic development and major policy paradigms such as DDR and
TJ. The articles in this special issue challenge this narrow and top-down focus,
placing socio-economic concerns and donor agendas in broader perspective.
Thirdly is the debate about returning ex-combatants and cycles of violence in
fragile contexts. The articles in this special issue offer conceptual insights into
this under-theorized area. Finally, is a growing literature on return as a political
process, involving the negotiation and re-negotiation of citizenship and political
community. The articles in this special issue bring a ‘public authority’ lens to this
important emerging research area, emphasizing the importance of understanding
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actually existing governance dynamics and the ways in which they may foster or
hinder fairer political outcomes.
Concept of Return
As made plain in the title of this introductory essay, return is a deeply political
process. Beyond the physical act of returning home, is the question, what to? If it
was a violent conflict that drove people from their homes in the first place, then
how has the political dispensation changed and what form of political community
is now possible and desirable? Katy Long writes that return and repatriation
should be viewed as a ‘restorative process’ with far greater ambitions than the
physical movement of displaced persons from A to B; a process that ‘contains
within it the possibility of constructing new forms of political community’ (Long
2013: 2). Megan Bradley similarly argues that right to ‘domicile’ return for IDPs,
as stated in the 1998 Guiding Principles, is a ‘narrow interpretation’, that ‘belies
the complexity of the moral and political claims at stake when IDPs assert their
right to return’ (2018: 218). Too often it seems, these deeper questions have been
neglected by international policy makers and governments, who view return and
repatriation as themost expedient option, the end-goal being re-establishment and
maintenance of international order based on the ‘status quo’, or as Crisp put it, to
reduce the number of refugees (we might also say IDPs) ‘on the international
community’s books’ (Crisp 2001: 172; Long 2013: 2).
As already noted, as these motivations became more evident, they came under
increasing scrutiny in academic scholarship and policy commentary, which docu-
mentedways inwhich organized returns departed from legal and ethical standards
of voluntariness and safety. Part of the problem, some argued, was that the
international community viewed concepts of return through a nationalist lens,
equating ‘return’ with ‘homecoming’, and the end of displacement with the re-
establishment of the ‘natural tie’ between persons and their ‘patria’ (Warner 1994;
Allen and Turton 1996; cf.Vlassenroot and Tegenbos 2018:6). Scholars interro-
gated ideas of ‘return’, ‘home-making’ and ‘emplacement’, and began to challenge
the simplistic ‘discourse of repatriation’, which equated return with a former
home, conceived territorially and spatially (Hammond 1999: 230; Hammond
2011: 505).
Rather than ‘home-coming’, it was suggested that something closer to ‘home-
making’ happens when refugees and IDPs ‘return’ (Hammond 2011: 505). This is
for several reasons. Firstly, repatriation does not necessarily mean return to a
previous home. Peoplewho have been displaced formany yearsmay not be able to
access former property or land and may be settled elsewhere (Allen and Morsink
1994; Hammond 1999). ‘Stayees’, those who did not flee, may now resist the re-
entry of returning populations, particularly where resources are scarce or political
divisions remain raw (Hammond 1999; Kibreab 2002; Bascom 2005; Fransen and
Kuschminder 2012; Barasa and Waswa 2015). Of course, not all returnees will
face such bleak prospects, but even in those situations where repatriation is a
largely positive experience, it still involves profound shifts in livelihood strategies,
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traditional social networks and the ‘positioning of the returnee in the context of
kin, community and the wider spheres of region and nation’ (Hammond 1999:
231). These shifts are always gendered. In her rich ethnographic study of displace-
ment and return among the Nuer of South Sudan for example, Grabska (2014)
shows that return is about navigating generational and gender norms to create a
new space and new home. Gendered experience as well as gendered imaginaries in
situations of return are variably part of producing, reproducing and/or disrupting
existing social orders and the persons who inhabit them.
The person returning then, may be substantially different from the person who
left. Displacement can be a hellish experience—theorists have drawn upon the
work of Giorgio Agamben, who, inspired by Foucault (1979) and Arendt (1973),
argued that refugee and IDP camps are archetypal ‘spaces of exception’, unregu-
lated by legal or political protections, where refugees live as ‘bare life’, or as
Bauman (2003) graphically put it ‘human waste’. These depictions may hold
some truth in certain settings but are hard to recognize in others (Cooper-
Knock and Long 2018). Asylum detention centres in Europe might be at one
end of the spectrum (Ibid: 60 Ramadan 2013). In other contexts though, displace-
ment might offer opportunities for economic activity, new skills, education, and
access to assistance regimes, exposure to new forms of media and global cultures.
Kakuma camp in Kenya, for example, which has hosted refugees mainly from
Sudan and Somalia, has been described as a ‘development camp’: ‘sophisticated
polities, with marketplaces, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, running water,
and decision-making for all’ (Wilde 1998: 108, cf.Hilhorst and Jansen 2010: 1123).
When the UNHCR deemed repatriation to Sudan to be safe for many of the
camps’ residents, refugee leaders expressed alarm at the poor infrastructure and
lack of schools and told the camp residents to stay put inKakuma (Ibid: 1128). Of
course not all refugees and IDPs live in camps, and experiences of exile and dis-
placement in other settlements and urban areas are also formative. Whatever the
experience people have had, it is likely to have been transformational in some
sense so that, as Hammond (1999: 229) writes, ‘whether a returnee comes back to
his or her birthplace or settles in an entirely new environment, he/she considers
return to bemore of a new beginning than a return to the past’. This is especially so
given the protracted nature of so many contemporary displacement situations.
Younger generations who came of age while displaced might have weakened
connections to ancestral lands and may even be ‘returning’ to a place they have
never lived.
These insights have led some scholars to dismiss the very notion of return and
repatriation as illusory and nostalgic, wrongly implying a fixed connection be-
tween ‘people, place and identity’ (Warner 1994; cf. Vlassenroot and Tegenbos
2018: 10). Hammond’s research on Ethiopian refugees repatriating from Sudan to
Ethiopia in the mid-1990s shows how imperfect terms like reintegration, recon-
struction and rehabilitation are. Rather than go back to the Highlands, from
where they fled, people developed a more economically sustainable ‘border cul-
ture’, drawing on skills and social networks formed in the refugee camps
(Hammond 1999: 243). In her comparative ethnography of camp and self-
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settled urban refugees from Burundi in western Tanzania, Malkki argues that
‘sedentrist’ thinking based on ‘nationalist discourses’ exaggerates the extent to
which displaced people feel a connection to a former home (Malkki 1995;
Kibreab 1999: 390). She finds that ideas of home and Hutu identity are fluid
and constructed according to different experiences of exile, therefore rejecting
what she calls ‘botanical metaphors’, in which people are described as ‘being
rooted in a place and as deriving their identity from that rootedness’ (1992: 27;
cf. Kibreab 1999: 391).
This conceptualization of ‘return’ is not shared by all. Pushing back against
what he sees as an excessively ‘de-territorialized’ view of the worldKibreab argues
that actually:
‘the relationship between a territory and identity, not in terms of a link between a
people and a soil, as such, but rather in terms of membership of a state occupying a
given territory with the right to exclude others from that territory, is significant’
(1999: 408).
Citizenship offers opportunity and security and it is connected to a ‘geograph-
ically bounded physical space’ from which people’s ‘entitlements emanate’ (ibid).
This, argues Kibreab, signals the enduring importance of repatriation because it
offers the possibility of membership of a political community. This recalls Long’s
(2013) extensive treatment of this very idea. Based on her fieldwork inGuatemala,
Long argued that repatriation must be viewed as more than the social act of
creating or recreating a ‘home’ because it denotes a process of negotiating or re-
negotiating political belonging, and by extension a social contract between state
and citizen.
Where Long (2013) goes further than Kireab is in her deterritorialization of the
concept. She sees what she terms ‘empatriation’ as the creation of a new political
community that is not necessarily physically bounded. It follows that you can re-
patriate to a political community without necessarily residing there. She draws
upon the experience of refugees in West Africa and Afghanistan who remained
mobile, largely for economic reasons, even after they had re-claimed their citizen-
ship in their home countries. Such arrangements have been endorsed by the
UNHCR and regional organizations as offering a durable solution to displace-
ment (UNHCR 2008, 2016; Long 2013: 2; Long 2010). Ongoing mobility has also
been advocated for as a durable solution for IDPs, where permanent settlement
may hinder economic opportunities and livelihoods (Bradley 2018: 225). Indeed
the arguments above in relation to voluntary return and ‘repatriation’ are also
largely applicable to IDP return.While IDPsmay not have crossed a border, their
flight was likely necessary because their own governments were ‘unable or unwill-
ing’ to offer themprotection frompersecution, conflict, violence and human rights
violations. As Bradley (2018: 221) points out, while the ‘regularization’ of citizen-
ship status may not be a concern, the end of displacement is a deeply political
process often involving the articulation of claims including the restitution of lost
property but also ‘redress of past wrongs, opposition to ethnic cleaning, and
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recognition as equal and legitimate members of the political community’. These
principled political claims,maywell be in tensionwith the political priorities of the
stayee community, but also with returning combatants and even those returning
as refugees.
Rethinking Mobilities and ‘Home’
The idea that ‘return’ might not mean permanent physical return has produced
interesting empirical studies of mobility and conceptual advances around the idea
of ‘home’ in protracted displacement situations, and the articles in this issue push
us further in this direction.
The acknowledgement of situations of ‘ambiguous’ return has given rise to
concepts such as ‘split return’ and ‘circular mobilities’. Research on South
Sudanese refugees in Uganda shows how refugees create ‘their own durable solu-
tion’ to exile and displacement through various strategies, including economic and
social integration in the host country (Hovil 2010: 1) and practices of ‘circular’
mobility, which involves visits to land and family in home countries but the main-
tenance of residence and refugee status in Uganda (Hovil 2010; Kaiser 2010). A
more formalized ‘spilt return’ has also been conceptualized in the literature and it
refers to those situations in which households split up to ease the return process
and mitigate against the economic and security risks it entails (Eastmond 2006;
Harpiviken 2014). For example, research shows how the Afghan return from Iran
and Pakistan in the early 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by keeping some
family members behind, whilst others returned to establish a viable new life
(Harpiviken 2014). Sometimes this kind of arrangement persisted for years on
end, ‘producing “migratory social capital” essential to households’ survival strat-
egies’ (Ibid: 68).
The articles in this special issue further conceptualize the empirical specificities
of such complex and multi-directional arrangements. In their ethnographic study
of cross-bordermobility among South Sudanese refugees inUganda,O’Byrne and
Ogeno question not only the one-dimensional nature of ‘repatriation discourse’
but also assumptions of ‘regularity’ and ‘predictability’ evoked by possible alter-
native and more dynamic concepts such as ‘circular’, ‘oscillating’, and ‘pendular’
mobility (some of which are favoured by others in the special issue). They point to
the diversity and uncertainty of what they term ‘pragmatic mobilities’. There was
the notorious ‘Owot the Driver’ who was well known amongst camp residents for
transporting goods and people, ‘both living and dead’, across the border, and
profiting well from doing so. But much more common was what they call ‘hu-
manitarian failure-induced mobility’, whereby ‘life in a refugee settlement was
simply too fragile to be bearable’. This was aggravated by the introduction of a
government Biometric Verification Exercise which aimed to regulate the distribu-
tion of food aid via finger printing and iris scanning technology but, in practice,
irregularized and constrained it.Without a transparent distribution timetable, and
with the banning of food collection on behalf of absentees, the new system
(adhered to by the UNHCR andWFP) meant that ‘pragmatic mobility’ for sheer
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survival became both harder and more necessary. Yet, despite often arising from
existential crises, the authors see these mobilities as ‘particularly powerful mani-
festations of agency, seeking to at least allow for the possibility of greater personal
and collective control in otherwise uncertain contexts’.
While O’Byrne and Ogeno’s concern centres around pragmatic spatial mobi-
lities, Mbu-Mputu and Trapido bring us into more ideational territory, where
imagined mobility and future homecoming feature as way of asserting political
membership and belonging. They examine the ideologies and practices of
Congolese nationalism in exile, and how this has informed ideas of home, belong-
ing and potential return which has changed dramatically over the years. The idea
of return becomes constitutive of diaspora politics; a mobilizing political platform
which shifts over time from consumer driven ideals about how to embody and
construct the ‘good life’ to a more radical ‘exile nationalism’. The authors trace
how this transformation has occurred as culturally validated figures of success and
authority have changed. They show how claims to authority and ways of fulfilling
obligations of belonging have shifted from the figure of ‘Mikilistes’ (malemigrants
resident in Europe who were the joyous patrons of musicians, dispensers of de-
signer goods and romancers of beautiful women), to ‘combattants’ (a diffuse group
of diaspora-based activist political opposition that has emerged since the 2000s
and are an important feature of the Congolese political scene). Their nationalism
is intimately connected with a love of ‘home’, their ‘obsession’ with return, and the
construction of transnational political fields.
Mbu-Mputu and Trapido’s article centres around an analysis of two socio-
political categories: the milikistes and the combattants, which almost exclusively
figured as male. In different ways, each of the articles in the special issue illustrate
ways that the experiences of displacement and return are gendered. This goes
beyond an analysis, however important, of the ways that men and women are
variably impacted by consequences of war and the ways that broader conceptions
of masculinity and femininity are mobilized and/or challenged through processes
of displacement or combat and subsequent ‘return’. Displacement itself has dif-
ferent meanings and is associated with (usually hierarchical) gendered positions.
In contrast to the situation noted above withmalemigration to Europe, women in
many of the other contexts considered in this special issue, under ordinary circum-
stances, are expected to leave their natal ancestral lands and to begin new affinal
homes on the land of their husband and his kin. Mobility itself then is gendered
‘female’. Porter points out that inAcholi, in northernUganda, even the etymology
behind the word ‘woman’ is a verb meaning ‘to migrate’. Estrangement from land
might thus be taken as feminizing, or as Shulz has argued of being subjected to
other wartime of violence, as a ‘displacement from gendered personhood’ (Shulz
2018).
Like Mbu-Mputu and Trapido, Porter continues with the theme of the imag-
ined ideal ‘home’, in this case as being central to rethinking mobilities, and ‘moral
geographies’ of camp and home. She explores how ‘home’ is being reconfigured in
the aftermath of displacement particularly as it pertains to intimate gender rela-
tionships. Wider societal movements into camps and subsequent ‘return’ entailed
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a host of spatial changes with a profound impact on ‘normal’ gendered orderings.
The mass displacement of over 90 per cent of the Acholi population in northern
Ugandameant that most people had limited, if any, access to land and cattle, with
the former greatly structuring everyday activities of gendered life and the latter the
basis for negotiating kinship relationships. What does it mean that for the time of
encampment virtually no new ‘marriages’ took place? She argues for casting spa-
tial considerations andmovement as central to understandings of ‘marriage’ more
broadly, but especially so as part of the project of making a home in the aftermath
of war. During the profound ruptures of war and displacement, she suggests,
gendered ideals of intimate relationships and the project ofmaking a home remain
surprisingly resilient, even if everyday realities are increasingly divergent. The
disjuncture between them opens a space where couples, kin groups and wider
public authorities are engaged in increasing contestation over the forces of imag-
ined ideals, sexual desires and aspirations for a good life.
Despite the massive upheavals entailed by decades of displacement, Porter’s
article indicates a surprising level of continuity at least in ideals of home. Pendle
and Akoi also refute the idea that exile and war are points of ‘total social rupture’,
showing how particular configurations of displacement itself were part of strate-
gizing for an aspired ‘good life’ when return became possible. Comparing two
different South Sudanese communities and how their experiences of displacement
shaped their ‘return’ from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, they show how exile
can ‘result in reproductive social processes as well as transformative social proc-
esses’. In the 1990s, young men who came to Kakuma from Gogrial in southern
Sudan were sent by families with military connections to benefit from the schools
set up by the UNHCR. For the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
commanders, for example, sending sons to Kakuma was part of a ‘strategy to
preserve their own and their families status through education’. Most people
fleeing from violence in Gogrial at this time were displaced internally. Access to
Kakuma was ‘carefully socially regulated’, and those who made it were politically
and militarily connected. In Bor on the other hand, in the early 1990s, almost the
entire population fled at once, and many families ended up in Kakuma for well
over a decade, regardless of social class, connections or gender. New universal
access to education in Kakuma represented a remarkable change from previous
life in Greater Bor. By the end of 2012, the UNHCR had assisted with the repat-
riation of 335,000 South Sudan repatriations, in addition to spontaneous and
‘split’ returns from Kakuma. The young men returning to Gogrial re-entered
the elite, quickly taking up jobs in NGOs and government: this was, after all,
‘part of their families planned trajectory for how they would serve the family and
gain authority’. Those returning to Bor on the other hand, had a very different
displacement history. Despite also receiving an education in Kakuma, many
remained unable to access employment on their return. These different return
trajectories highlight how varied circumstances of displacement shape opportu-
nities upon ‘return’, even decades after flight.
The articles in this special issue therefore rethink mobilities as multi-directional
and dynamic. They conceptualize ties to ‘home’ as tethered to geographic and
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social imaginaries, but not necessarily linked to physical dwelling. Indeed ‘home’
is a resilient but contested idea that evolves in response to changing material
realities. We now turn to focus on how the articles in this special issue reveal
how belonging and social repair are negotiated in such complex environs.
Negotiating Belonging
Since the emergence of an international policy trajectory from the late 1980s on-
wards that has sought to tie refugee and IDP humanitarian assistance to longer
term development objectives, there has been significant scholarly interest in the
socio-economic challenges of re-integration once repatriation/resettlement has
occurred. Articles in this special issue seek to understand how standardized
approaches to reintegration—such as DDR, TJ, and PSS—are experienced by
returnees and stayees; and relatedly, how social repair and sustainable livelihoods
emerge outside of these interventionist frameworks.
In their study of ex-combatant return in Mbandaka, the provincial capital of
Equatuer province in north-western DRC, Carayannis and Pangburn survey the
relative failure of numerous ‘Western-driven’ attempts to finance and implement
DDR programmes, including the $200 million World-Bank co-ordinated
National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(CONADER) launched in 2002. Echoing findings elsewhere, they argue that in
DRC, conventional DDR programming, which foregrounds vocational training
and modest support packages for former combatants are ‘insufficient to sustain
them in civilian life’ and ‘often fail’. Instead, they tell the fascinating story of the
tolekistes, a several thousand strong group of ex-combatants who havemanaged a
degree of socio-economic re-integration by forming a unionized bicycle-taxi or-
ganization, equipped with the bicycles provided by the failed CONADER pro-
gramme. They find that ex-combatants are most likely to ‘return’ to where they
have support systems, and in the case of the Toleka, the social support structures
provided by union membership offered the best chance of post-war socio-eco-
nomic integration. At the same time, they point out that ‘a strong, locally owned
support, and re-integration network like the Toleka union can only be as success-
ful as the conditions around it permit’. While the Tolekistes have managed to
construct a new identity as ‘some of the hardest working people’ in a town that is
‘driven, literally, by these bicycle taxis’, sustainable reintegration into civilian life
remains a complex political process, and 79% of the 100 of whom were inter-
viewed, said they would consider joining the army or armed group again. We
explore the significance of this in the next section.
Articles by Anna Macdonald and Raphael Kerali, and Tim Allen et al. in this
issue also explore how international and national programmes aimed at facilitat-
ing reintegration after return have sporadic, unintended or unpredictable
impacts—and indeed—how life goes on in spite of, or in the shadow of such
interventions. In their study of stigma and stigmatization of LRA returnees in
northern Uganda, Macdonald, and Kerali look beyond meta-narratives of ‘tran-
sitional justice’ in Acholiland, Uganda to explore return dynamics of post-war
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village life in the aftermath of mass displacement across the region. Focusing on
male returnees believed to have been forcibly abducted by the LRA, they find that,
on return, stigmatization and exclusion by the broader community is likely to
depend on three (sometimes interlinked) factors: firstly, whether individual be-
haviour of the returnee is considered ‘good’ and ‘normal’, meaning economically
productive and respectful to others; secondly whether the returnee is thought to
have come back from the LRA with bad spirits that will ‘contaminate’ the local
environs; and third whether the returnee is considered a threat to resources in the
context of post-displacement political economies of survival, particularly in rela-
tion to land. They find that because it happens for different reasons, stigmatiza-
tion serves a range of functions. Often it is deliberately exclusionary, rooted in
rejection, even the desire for expulsion from village life. In other instances, it is
based on cultural ideas related to the importance of cleansing and/or shame in re-
socializing individuals after wrong-doing and is re-integrative in purpose. Uniting
this, stigmatization functions as a form of resistance to international and national
discourses around amnesty, forgiveness and anti-stigma, and as a way of people
and communities expressing some agency in spaces of return.
Allen et al. examine the troubling question of what happened to the children
who returned from the LRA. Quite strikingly, they find that in following
UNICEF best practice guidelines on the social reintegration of child soldiers by
placing returnees with immediate relatives, NGOs and UN agencies were actually
causing unintentional harm. In their follow up of a random sample of 230 retur-
nees that had returned via one NGO-administered reception centre, Allen et al.
find that those who are most likely to ‘abuse or reject’ returned children (most of
whom are now in their 20s or 30s) are their own family members. This is largely
because of concerns about access to customary land within extended family net-
works, but also because of fears that returnees come back contaminated by pol-
luting spirits that will harm others. A particularly vulnerable group—as in other
contexts—were those young women who returned with children who had been
‘born in captivity’: a third of the sample fell into this category. It is interesting to
note that 15% of females and 12% ofmales in the sample are now renting plots of
land to cultivate near towns and trading centres. Here, theymight also have access
to funded support networks for LRA returnees and also ‘socially supportive’
Pentecostal churches—indeed many had become ‘born again’. The authors con-
clude that ‘in general, return from the LRA has been most successful where inte-
gration into rural life has failed or not been attempted’. The article exposes serious
problems with the central assumptions guiding international agreements such as
the Inter-agency Guiding Principles on Separated andUnaccompanied Children—at
the very least, Allen et al. suggest, children being reunited with families in con-
ditions of acute deprivation (often IDP camps) and severe social instability—
should have been followed up systematically.
These articles raise serious questions about the legacies of humanitarian assist-
ance in contexts of displacement and return. This is the broad topic that animates
Kara Blackmore’s article in this issue, also in the northern Ugandan context.
Blackmore’s study is concerned with ‘what was left behind’ after IDPs returned
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home. She argues that the material remains of displacement and aid assistance—
objects, archives andhuman remains—triggermemories that shape daily life in the
post-war present. She shows how these challenge the official ‘memorial complex’
as curated by humanitarian, religious, NGO, and state initiatives. Showcased in
exhibitions and documented in reports, official memories present a partial, polit-
ically authorized picture of conflict legacies that exculpate the Ugandan state and
position the LRA as the ‘singular antagonist’ during the conflict. They also ef-
fectively erase humanitarian failures around the administering of the camps; the
management of returns and the destruction of personal records and data.
Through her interviews, she shows how the continued use and re-making of
rationed objects such as food assistance tins; watering cans and lanterns create
a ‘material landscape’ that allows for the ‘wider exchange of memory’. Material
remains also refer to human remains and ‘haphazard’ burial sites that remain
scattered in former displacement sites reminding people that proper Acholi rites
and rituals for the dead were not possible during those times. The article extends
our thinking beyond conceptualizing return as pertaining only or even primarily
to living populations, and rather prompts us to consider the ways that the dead
and other ongoing interactions with material remains of displacement shape the
negotiation of belonging in new spaces upon ‘return’.
The findings in these articles complicate conventional policy ideas about what
constitutes successful re-integration. TheUNHCR for example, notes that returns
are both ‘effective’ and ‘sustainable’, when ‘returnees are similar to the local
population in terms of socio-economic conditions and security’ (UNHCR 1997:
2; cf Vlassenroot 13). According to the IASC Framework, a durable solution has
been reached for IDPs when they ‘no longer have any specific assistance and
protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy
their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement’ (cf.
Bradley 2018: 223). Yet while global policy agendas around economic livelihoods,
DDR and TJmay have resonance, they often belie everyday realities of the people
concerned. People navigate these systems amidst many others, making claims
upon them or circumventing them as they set up unions; move to towns; negotiate
with elders over burials and pursue social repair in situations of chronic economic
and political insecurity. At the same time—many are left vulnerable in part be-
cause of the misapprehension of the specificities of their lives and struggles.
Cycles of Return and Cycles of Conflict
Despite a significant literature exploring the relationship between out-migration
and conflict onset, very little research has been conducted on the relationship
between return migration and conflict, and the ‘security implications of return
migration are undertheorized’ (Schwartz 2019: 112). In a recent article on refugee
return and post-conflict violence in Burundi, Schwartz points to Bosnia
Herzegovina, Iraq, South Sudan, and El Salvador to argue that ‘conflict between
returning and non-migrant populations after civil war is a nearly ubiquitous issue
for societies recovering from such wars’, often triggering further waves of
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insecurity and displacement (2019: 110). In Burundi, she finds that ‘migration-
related group identities’ have formed during different phases of the conflict. On
return after the 1992–2005 civil war, reified distinctions between repartries and
residents were likely to become violent when certain groups perceived themselves
to be excluded from post-conflict institutions, particularly those related to land
governance ‘based on where they were physically located during wartime’ (144).
While most of the articles in this special issue imply the potential for generalized
insecurity and violent conflict as a result of uncertain or unsettled returns,
Vlassenroot et al. focus specifically on this question. In their article on combatants
and former combatants in eastern DRC, they analyse the phenomenon whereby
youth have been engaged in processes of ‘incessant’ armed mobilization and de-
mobilization. Adopting the lens of ‘circular return’ (see above) they show how
rank-and-file combatants move agentively and fluidly between different ‘social
spaces’ of fighter and civilian, and indeed, how neither of these categories are well
suited to describing their realities. They present a challenge to macro-arguments
which neatly connect the failure of DDR efforts to a delineated ‘remobilization’
process. However, rather than use a security frame to understand combatant
return dynamics, they are interested in the processes of social mobilization and
‘social rupture’ that inform individual decisions to join, leave and re-join armed
groups. This granular level analysis tells us that for rank-and-file combatants,
armed groups produce ‘rules, values and resources’, and by extension forms of
‘social and symbolic capital’ that are ruptured on return to civilian life: ‘return to
combat, in this sense, is a reclaim to what was lost as a consequence of
demobilization’. In eastern DRC, movement between combatant and civilian
spaces and identities is not a one-off event but a form of constant ‘pendular mo-
bility’ which is driven by interlocking dynamics of pressure by former
commanders; fluctuating insecurity at home; frustration with re-integration into
civilian life; a fragmented military landscape; and nostalgia for the social and
material benefits of combatant life. At the same time ‘being part of an armed
group does not include a rupture with other social spaces. In fact, combatants in
most cases remain connected to their home communities’: via mobile phone com-
munications, messengers, and even physical visits when military operations are
close to home villages.
Akoi and Pendle similarly point to the ways that ‘return’ cannot be equated
with a rupture from a history of engaging in armed conflict. Far from it.
Their comparison of young men returning from the SPLA in the regions of
Greater Gogrial and Greater Bor in South Sudan shows how sustained links to
the military, elite and even possession of or access to arms continues to play a role
in their present as a strategy of social negotiation—again showing the poor fit of
socio-legal categories of civilian and combatant. As explored in the next section,
such ongoing linkages, impermanence and ambiguous statuses in situations of
‘return’ play into contestations and negotiations of public authority in ‘return’
settings.
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Return and the Re-Negotiation of Public Authority
In the same way that return is simplistically equated with ‘home’, it can be erro-
neously conflated with ‘peace’ and the end of a political process. While studies of
displacement regularly highlight the ways in which refugees and IDPs are stripped
of fundamental rights, research exploring how the process of return reshapes
power, politics and ideas of citizenship has only emerged quite recently (Long
2013; Vlassenroot andTegenbos 2018: 19). Studies showhow the process of return
is deeply constitutive of on-going negotiations around statehood, political legit-
imacy and belonging (e.g. Stepputat 1999; Metsola 2010; Soderstrom 2015). In
war and genocide situations where ethnicity was politicized and weaponized, ‘re-
turn’ can involve state-level re-constitution of social and ethnic categories as part
of nation-building and statecraft. It is argued, for example, that in post-genocide
Rwanda, new inclusive/exclusive citizenship categories have been created which
are based on roles during the genocide but also patterns and histories of mobility
(Turner 2015). Studies have also shown howhumanitarian assistance programmes
for returnees can re-shape state-society relationships, even if this were not the
intended end-goal. In Afghanistan for example, the UNHCR became involved
in the Afghan Land Allocation Scheme which granted landless Afghan returnees
full Afghan citizenship and had significant implications for statebuilding proc-
esses (Scalettaris 2013).Recently, there has also been interest in the role of refugees
and IDPs in peace agreements (e.g. Koser 2007; Andersen-Rodgers 2015). There is
some agreement, however, that IDPs in particular tend to be marginalized during
negotiations (ibid).
Despite providing very useful insights into the ‘politics of return’ much of this
literature is state-centric and top-down, analysing the political process of return
through the lens of national discourses, international frameworks such as peace
agreements and international paradigms, such as DDR and TJ. ( The articles in
this special issue instead view the politics of return through a ‘public authority’
lens. This lens takes as its starting point the fact that the governance arrangements
in the contexts under study depart dramatically from ideal-typical depictions of
theWeberian state.Whether inDRC, South Sudan, orUganda, the case studies in
this special issue engage with return dynamics in situations where the state is
relatively absent; exploitative; distrusted and/or weakly resourced. A public au-
thority perspectives focuses on how the governance of people, territory and
resources actually functions under such conditions (Lund 2006; Hoffmann and
Vlassenroot 2014; ). State institutions may operate, but it is likely that the func-
tions and services associated with ‘the state’—justice, security, education, and
healthcare—for example, are delivered in combination, or indeed in parallel,
with other public authorities that claim legitimacy and power and enjoy a degree
of popular consent. This might include, for example, customary chiefs and elders,
religious authorities and groups, kinship networks, self-help groups, civil society
organizations, humanitarian agencies, organized criminal gangs, militias and reb-
els (Hoffmann and Kirk 2013). By analysing ‘return’ dynamics through a public
authority lens, the articles in this special issue advance our understanding of
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actually existing political orders. These orders may make social repair, mutuality
and economic activity possible but can also contribute exclusion, further violence
and thus further cycles of displacement.
As studies in DRC by Carayannis and Pangburn and Vlassenroot et al. dem-
onstrate, elite public authority dynamics tend to be corrupt, exclusionary or
predatory so that sustainable return and re-integration is very difficult and, par-
ticularly for former combatants, a return to armed groups becomes a viable and
attractive option for many. Armed groups can be, as Vlassenroot et al. argue, ‘a
refuge to deal with joblessness, and a space of political and economic opportun-
ity’.Meanwhile, peace processes inDRChave had ‘little effect on the local politics
of mobilization’, and as armed groups have proliferated, they have evolved into
‘dominant power brokers’. As public authorities they work alongside local and
national political and customary leaders to impose or sustain—in the words of one
respondent ‘spaces of transit for those in search of responses to their needs’ .
Carayannis and Pangburn meanwhile show how, for the tolekistes, despite man-
aging a degree of socio-economic re-integration, frustration with perceived cor-
ruption and poor functioning of the provincial government has created severe
disillusionment with civilian life .
As different forms of public authority regulate social, economic and political
order, they can assume the role of ‘societies moral guardians, deciding what con-
stitutes acceptable behaviour and who is and is not part of the community’ (Kirk
and Green 2020: 5). In Uganda, this is seen in public authorities’ contests to
regulate sexuality and social reproduction. Porter’s study indicates ways that
the spatial configuration in camps undermined gerontocratic control and eroded
the material basis of elders authority over youth as the allegiances of young men
shifted away from kin and towards their peers. In the period of return, they con-
tinue to grapple with the reverberations of the drastic reduction in formal mar-
riages and disruptions of ‘normal’ gendered life. Allen et al. meanwhile, analyse
the public authority dynamics of patrilineal landholding, kinship networks, and
spiritual pollution to explain how the humanitarian approach of relocating LRA
returnees (many of whomwere children when they were taken by the rebel group)
with immediate relatives had negative consequences. In terms of political com-
munity asMacdonald andKerali show in northernUganda, at themost local level
there was a degree of consensus among public authority figures and the broader
village community, that LRA returnees must conduct themselves in a way that is
conducive to the ‘normal’ functioning of social and economic relationships and
spiritual balance. Those returnees believed to have transgressed certain moral and
normative boundaries were likely to experience stigmatization. This stigmatiza-
tion was a form of social accountability and could often be deeply exclusionary,
including, for example, preventing the ‘wrong’ sort of returnee access to authority
positions within the local-level political structure of the village.
The UNHCR does not make much reference to political re-integration in its
policy frameworks, preferring instead to measure ‘effective reintegration’ as those
situations in which returnees enjoy the same socio-economic and security condi-
tions as stayees (Fransen 2017: 1; Vlassenroot andTegenbos 2018: 20). And yet, as






/jrs/article/33/4/639/6209808 by guest on 12 April 2021
the articles in this special issue, and other scholarship attests, this cannot be
achieved in the absence of inclusive political processes and arrangements (e.g.
Long ,2013; McMullin 2013). As in many other contexts, in DRC, South
Sudan, and Uganda, returnees were coming back into unstable political environ-
ments, better conceptualized through the lens of complex public authority dynam-
ics, than ideal-type Weberian governance. International frameworks that have
sought to build the state in such places have failed, in part, because they ignored
how actually existing governance functions and promoted externally designed,
top-down models that floundered on implementation. The articles in this special
issue serve well to remind us of the importance of conceptualizing return as a
deeply complex and contextual political process, the trajectory of which is shaped
and re-shaped by public authority dynamics that can only bemade fairer, just and
more peaceful if they are understood.
Conclusion
In different ways, the articles in this special issue demonstrate the inadequacy of
static frames used to conceptualize the experiences of populations on the move as
a result of violent conflict. Return, repatriation, demobilization, reintegration and
reconciliation are operational categories that have been devised in order to design
policies and provide services, for refugees, IDPs and former combatants. As
peace-building and development paradigms, however, they belie the dynamism
of displacement and return.As the articles in this special issue show, experiences of
displacement and return diverge from and complicate temporal, spatial, and
socio-legal assumptions that continue, to a large extent, to be employed by the
UNHCR, aid agencies, states and many scholars in more or less nuanced ways.
This introductory essay has traced the diminishing prospects of the long-held
‘durable solution’ of return amidst the staggering growth of displacement, increas-
ingly contained within borders. Yet, despite the difficulties and complexities of
achieving anything like permanent ‘return’, the idea of it continues to feature in
imaginaries of international and national policies, as well as in the minds of
displaced and ‘demobilized’ populations. As the articles in this special issue
show, the moral and political stakes of the project of return are high. Return
entails not just a re-configuration of persons and places, nor entirely new arrange-
ments. Social, political, and symbolic capital is accrued, disrupted and re-shaped
in the constant mobility in and out of spaces (camps, settlements, military bases,
homes) that are not always as distinct as is imagined. In DRC, South Sudan and
northern Uganda, standardized approaches to return and reintegration have
failed to engage with multi-directional and fluid mobilities or with the political
complexity that continues to shape daily lives, as public authorities contest for
power in contexts of limited statehood. While social repair and sustainable live-
lihoods have emerged outside of and in relation to these interventionist frame-
works, cycles of violence have also persisted, or seem very close to being triggered.
Static frames are used to make lives on the move more legible, but they do very
little to help us understand what is really happening. The frames used in this
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special issue on the other hand—re-thinking mobilities; the negotiation of belong-
ing; cycles of return and conflict; and the variable roles of public authority in
processes of return—help us re-think the difficulties and possibilities of ‘return’ as
policy-makers andmany displaced persons continue to see it as the most preferred
‘durable solution’.
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